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INDEPENDENCE SANS ACCOUNTABILITY:  
A CASE FOR RIGHT TO INFORMATION 
AGAINST THE INDIAN JUDICIARY 
SUPRIYA ROUTH

 
ABSTRACT 
The Indian Supreme Court may be standing at a historic juncture 
where it could throw open the doors to the public to question its 
accountability by disclosing information pertaining to the assets and 
interests of the judges of the higher judiciary. The Supreme Court, 
however, seems reluctant to bring the higher judiciary under the purview 
of the Right to Information Act. A tussle has already emerged between the 
Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court, with the former seeking to bring 
the higher judiciary under the information law and justifying the need for 
disclosure of assets of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts. The Supreme Court has been resisting the disclosure of such 
information on grounds of independence, confidentiality, and possible 
breach of fiduciary duty.  
In this Article, I chart the recent tussle and discuss the present law 
regarding the Right to Information in the country, specifically the 
exemptions to the general rule of disclosure, and examine the Supreme 
Court’s position. I analyze whether disclosure of assets and other interests 
of judges of the higher judiciary adversely affects the independence of the 
judiciary. I argue that in order to maintain the people’s faith in the 
judiciary and to promote democratically grounded judicial independence, 
it is imperative for the higher judiciary to adopt transparency in its 
functioning and salvage its reputation before the people’s confidence in it 
withers away forever.  
 
 
  France-ILO Chair at the Nantes Institute for Advanced Study, Nantes, France. Work on this 
article was done as a Rechtskulturen Fellow, Faculty of Law, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. I 
thank Debadyuti Banerjee for her research assistance for the article. I also thank the editorial team of 
the Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. for their excellent editorial assistance. Remaining errors are my 
responsibility.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is fascinating that the Indian Supreme Court wishes to hear its own 
case regarding the applicability of the Right to Information Act of 2005 
(the RTI Act) to the judges of the Court. The RTI Act empowers an Indian 
citizen to seek information from public authorities in the country. The Act 
also mandates public authorities to suo motu disclose information 
available to them. The Act, however, exempts certain information from 
disclosure, even if it is available with public authorities. Additionally, the 
RTI Act exempts some public authorities from falling within the 
legislation entirely. Even though the higher judiciary is not exempted from 
the purview of the RTI Act, the Supreme Court of India wants to examine 
the scope of the Act vis-à-vis the higher judiciary. The anticipated hearing 
attains further significance because a former Chief Justice of India (CJI) 
expressed reservations while in office about bringing the office of the 
chief justice and the judges of the Court under the transparency legislation.  
The concerned Chief Justice opined, “The Chief Justice is not a public 
servant. He is a constitutional authority. RTI does not cover constitutional 
authorities.”1 The day a three-judge bench of the Delhi High Court upheld 
the judgment of a single bench, holding that the Supreme Court and the 
judges come within the purview of the RTI Act, the Supreme Court 
decided to challenge the judgment of the Delhi High Court.
2
 The 
judiciary’s attempt to avoid the RTI Act is reminiscent of the executive’s 
concerted efforts to exclude administrative “file notings” from the purview 
of the RTI Act in the not-so-distant past.
3
  
The purpose of the RTI Act is to allow citizens to have access to 
information available to public authorities in furtherance of promoting 
transparency and accountability, and to limit corruption amongst public 
 
 
 1. RTI Act Does Not Apply to My Office: CJI, TIMES OF INDIA (Apr. 20, 2008, 12:34 AM), 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/RTI-Act-does-not-apply-to-my-office-CJI/articleshow/2964 
678.cms. The Chief Judge later clarified his statement on NDTV, stating that it depends upon the 
interpretation of the RTI Act as to whether the Chief Justice of India office comes within the scope of 
the law. See NDTV, RTI Could Extend to Judges: CJI, YOUTUBE (May 10, 2008), http://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=ASsFMq1zyBg. 
 2. SC to Appeal Against HC Verdict, INDIAN EXPRESS (Jan. 12, 2012, 8:33 PM), 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sc-to-appeal-against-hc-verdict/566544. 
 3. Satyapal v. CPIO, TCIL, (2006) Appeal No. ICPB/A-1/CIC/2006 (Cent. Info. Comm’n, 
India), available at http://cic.gov.in/CIC-Orders/CIC_Order_Dtd_310106.htm; see also Centre 
Backtracks on Information Act, HINDU (Aug. 20, 2006), http://www.hindu.com/2006/08/20/stories/ 
2006082015020100.htm. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/7
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officials.
4
 The Supreme Court’s stand suggests that either the Court is 
against the transparency or accountability principles in judicial 
functioning, or it denies possibilities of corruption in its rank and file. 
How else can the Court’s consistent resistance to the application of the 
RTI Act be explained? The assertion that the Supreme Court is against 
principles of transparency and accountability is untenable because, time 
and again, the Court has preached principles of transparency, 
accountability, and public participation.
5
 That brings us to the other 
possibility: is the Court denying corruption within its ranks? It is difficult 
to sustain such a claim in view of the facts that will emerge in the course 
of this Article. 
I examine the Supreme Court’s plea for its exclusion from the purview 
of the RTI Act and examine the validity of the plea on legal and policy 
grounds. I argue that the Supreme Court’s plea for exclusion from the RTI 
Act is unsustainable in view of the mandate of the Act, the Constitution of 
India, and the allegations of misconduct against judges in recent times. 
These factors call for a sustained application of the information law to 
ensure prestige and independence in the functioning of the judiciary and to 
restore public confidence in the institution. I also argue that disclosure 
under the RTI Act does not impact the independence of the judiciary.  
This Article is divided into seven parts. In Part II, I discuss the 
culmination of the dispute regarding disclosure of assets and other 
interests of judges, and the decision of the Delhi High Court in that 
respect. In Part III, I find support in favor of the decision of the Delhi High 
Court by analyzing the relevant provisions of the RTI Act. In Part IV, I 
discuss why the higher judiciary in general—and the Supreme Court in 
particular—is duty bound to disclose information about the conduct of 
judges. In Part V, I point out that the Supreme Court has gradually 
insulated the higher judiciary from any democratic outlet in the name of 
independence of the judiciary. I argue that such insulation is not supported 
 
 
 4. The Right to Information Act, pmbl., No. 22 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2011), available at 
indiacode.nic.in [hereinafter RTI Act]. 
 5. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which provides the “right to freedom,” recognizes 
freedom of information as a fundamental right in a plethora of judgments of the Supreme Court in 
different contexts to ensure transparency and accountability in public functioning. INDIA CONST. art. 
19. The Supreme Court, in a number of cases, pointed out that the right to “freedom of speech and 
expression” in article 19 includes the right to information. Prominent cases in this regard are: State of 
Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975) 3 S.C.R. 333 (India); Sec’y, Ministry of Info. & Broad., Govt. of 
India and others v. Cricket Ass’n of Bengal and others (1995) 2 S.C.C. 16; Sheela Barse v. State Of 
Maharashtra (1987) 4 S.C.C. 373; Union Of India v. Ass’n For Democratic Reforms and Another 
(2002) 5 S.C.C. 294; People’s Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) and Another, Petitioner v. Union of 
India and Another (2003) 1 S.C.C. 2353; S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) 4 S.C.C. 87. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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by the Constitution and accordingly, for the promotion of democratically 
grounded independence of the judiciary, the higher judiciary needs to offer 
a democratic outlet by sharing information. In Part VI, I justify the right to 
information on the basis of the democratic underpinning of the 
Constitution of India. I conclude the Article in Part VII. 
II. TUSSLE BETWEEN THE DELHI HIGH COURT & THE SUPREME COURT 
It all began with an RTI application filed under the RTI Act with the 
Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) of the Supreme Court by Mr. 
Subhash Chandra Agarwal seeking a copy of the 1997 Resolution of the 
Supreme Court on asset declarations by the judges, and whether such 
declarations have been made by the judges of the Supreme Court and the 
High Courts in pursuit of the Resolution.
6
 While the CPIO gave 
information about the Resolution to the applicant, the CPIO remained 
silent on the second part of the request, i.e., whether judges have disclosed 
their assets or not. On appeal under the RTI Act, the first Appellate 
Authority remanded the issue back to the CPIO, which the latter rejected.
7 
The final Appellate Authority under the RTI Act, the Central Information 
Commission (CIC), in its decision on January 6, 2009, directed the CPIO 
to disclose the information about the judges’ declaration of assets.8  The 
CPIO and the Registrar of the Supreme Court (who was later added as a 
party) challenged the Order of the CIC in the Delhi High Court, asking the 
Court to determine the scope of the RTI Act with respect to its 
applicability to the judges of the higher judiciary (Supreme Court and the 
High Courts).
9
 The single bench of the High Court disposing of the 
petition directed the CPIO to make the information available to the 
applicant within four weeks.
10
 Undaunted by the successive setbacks, the 
Supreme Court, through the Secretary General of the Court, appealed the 
judgment of the single bench of the Delhi High Court. A three-judge 
bench of the Delhi High Court upheld the single bench decision on 
 
 
 6. RTI Applications are not published; hence, information about the Application comes from 
Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal, C.I.C. Appeal No. CIC/WB/A/2008/00426 (2009), available at 
http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/FB-06012009-01.pdf. 
 7. Id. ¶ 3. 
 8. Id. 
 9. The CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal and Another, W.P. (C) 
288/2009, (2009) MANU 1926 (DE), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SRB/judgement/02-09-2009/ 
SRB02092009CW2882009.pdf 
 10. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/7
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January 12, 2010.
11
 The bench dismissed the appeal without any 
interference.
12
 The Supreme Court decided to challenge the three-bench 
judgment of the Delhi High Court.
13
 The full bench of the Supreme Court 
would consider the logic of the High Court judgment.
14
 
Why does the Supreme Court think that the decision needs revision? 
What were the objections of the Supreme Court throughout the 
proceedings in the CIC, and the consecutive benches of the High Court? 
An analysis of the High Court judgment(s) would make these issues clear. 
The single bench of the High Court addressed the following issues: 
(1) Whether the CJI is a public authority;  
(2) Whether the office of CPIO, of the Supreme Court of India, is 
different from the office of the CJI; and if so, whether the RTI Act 
covers the office of the CJI;  
(3) Whether asset declarations by Supreme Court judges, pursuant 
to the 1997 Resolution is “information”, under the Right to 
Information Act, 2005; 
(4) If such asset declarations are “information,” does the CJI hold 
them in a “fiduciary” capacity, and are they therefore, exempt from 
disclosure under the Act;  
(5) Whether such information is exempt from disclosure by reason 
of Section 8(1)(j) of the Act;  
(6) Whether the lack of clarity about the details of asset declaration 
. . . , as well as lack of security renders asset declarations and their 
disclosure, unworkable.
15
 
Analyzing the definitions of the phrases “public authority”16 and 
“competent authority”17 under the RTI Act, the Court held that the Office 
of the CJI is a public authority that is duty-bound to provide information. 
 
 
 11. Sec’y Gen., Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, LPA No. 501/2009, 
(2010) MANU 0013 (DE), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/APS/judgement/12-01-2010/APS1201 
2010LPA5012009.pdf.  
 12. Id. 
 13. SC to Appeal Against HC Verdict, supra note 2. 
 14. SC Full Court to Consider Implication of HC Judgement: CJI, INDIAN EXPRESS (Jan. 13, 
2010, 6:20 PM), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sc-full-court-to-consider-implication-of-hc-
judgement-cji/566972/.  
 15. The CPIO, Supreme Court of India, W.P. (C) 288/2009.  
 16. RTI Act, supra note 4, § 2(h). 
 17. Id. § 2(e). 
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The Court further held that the office of the CPIO is not different from the 
office of the CJI. The office of the CJI is an integrated office performing a 
diverse range of functions.
18
 Unlike the United States of America (where 
the Chief Justice is the chief of only the United States Supreme Court), the 
CJI is the chief of the Indian judiciary—the entirety of the justice system 
constitutes a public authority. Moreover, the RTI Act does not expressly 
exclude the office of the CJI from the applicability of the law as it does 
with some other institutions.
19
 Hence the RTI Act applies to the office of 
the CJI as a public authority.
20
 
The High Court judge further noted that the definition of 
“information”21 under the RTI Act clarifies that the declaration of assets 
(made to the CJI) by the Supreme Court judges constitutes information, 
even if no constitutional or statutory law has mandated such disclosure. To 
hold that the disclosure did not constitute disclosable information under 
the RTI Act, and that the disclosure was mandated by a non-binding 
resolution, rather than by law, would amount to a narrow, technical 
reading, which would defeat the very purpose of the law and thereby 
undermine the high offices of the CJI and the Supreme Court.
22
  
Observing that the judges of the Supreme Court hold independent 
offices, the Court disputed the fact that there can be a fiduciary relation 
between the CJI and other judges of the Supreme Court.
23
 Hence, the 
Delhi High Court held that asset declaration is not exempted under the 
exception clause, which excludes information available in a fiduciary 
relationship from mandated disclosure.
24
 
However, the Delhi High Court further observed that the declaration of 
assets by the judges constitutes personal information under the law
25
 and 
can only be disclosed if the public interest warrants such disclosure, which 
is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In the present context, the 
request for information only sought to ascertain whether the judges have 
filed their asset declarations (and not the substantive declaration of 
individual assets). The High Court held that such information does not fall 
 
 
 18. See INDIA CONST. arts. 124–47, 214–37. Apart from being responsible for judging disputes 
and allocating litigation to other judges of the Supreme Court, the CJI acts in administrative and 
advisory capacities. The CJI also administers oath of office to the President of India. INDIA CONST. art. 
60. 
 19. RTI Act, supra note 4, § 24. 
 20. The CPIO, Supreme Court of India, W.P. (C) 288/2009. 
 21. RTI Act, supra note 4, § 2(j). 
 22. The CPIO, Supreme Court of India, W.P. (C) 288/2009. 
 23. Id. 
 24. RTI Act, supra note 4, § 8(1)(e). 
 25. Id. § 8(1)(j). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/7
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within the exclusion mandate of section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, which 
exempts disclosure of personal information. Therefore, such information 
should be disclosed.
26
 On what constitutes “assets,” the High Court called 
upon the CJI to develop a working understanding of the term in 
consultation with other judges of the Supreme Court.
27
 The High Court 
noted that in absence of such an understanding, information regarding 
asset disclosure could be misused.
28
  
Not satisfied with the judgment, the Supreme Court challenged the 
single bench decision on the counts “that the applicant had no right to 
information”29 under the RTI Act on matters that are not in public domain 
(in this case, the asset declaration pursuant to the 1997 Resolution, lacking 
the force of law);
30
 that such information is held in a fiduciary capacity by 
the CJI; and that such information constitutes personal information, the 
disclosure of which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy.
31
 The 
Supreme Court, however, conceded that the Court and the office of the CJI 
is a public authority and covered by the RTI Act.
32
 Neither party, however, 
made submissions on the un-workability of the information regime 
because of the absence of an appropriate definition of the term “asset.”33 
The three-judge bench considered the constitutional and statutory 
connotation of the right to information.
34
 The bench concluded that for any 
document or record to become information under the RTI Act it is not 
necessary that the information be “under the legal control of the public 
authority.”35 It will suffice if the public authority has received, used, or 
retained such information.
36
 In this case, since the CJI can receive and 
retain the asset declarations, it constitutes information under the RTI Act. 
The bench further noted that the drawback regarding implementation and 
enforcement does not make the 1997 Resolution any less binding.
37
 Judges 
of the High Courts have been acting according to the resolution, and have 
disclosed their assets upon the belief that the resolution is binding, though 
 
 
 26. The CPIO, Supreme Court of India, W.P. (C) 288/2009. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Sec’y Gen., Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, LPA No. 501/2009, 
(2010) MANU 0013 (DE). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. This understanding of the Supreme Court goes against the initial understanding of the 
then CJI, who noted that the CJI is not a public servant.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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not enforceable.
38
 Thus, in essence what the three-judge bench held is that 
irrespective of whether a judge discloses his or her assets pursuant to the 
1997 Resolution or not, if such information is available with the CJI it 
constitutes information under the RTI Act. Therefore, citizens would have 
right to information on asset declarations by the judges of the Supreme 
Court, the High Courts, and the CJI. 
Concurring with the single-judge reasoning, the three-judge bench of 
the Delhi High Court denied the fiduciary and confidentiality claim made 
by the appellants.
39
 The Court also concurred with the single judge in 
holding that assets are personal information, and can only be disclosed 
when overarching public interest demands such disclosure.
40
 They also 
noted that the information, whether asset declarations have been made or 
not (but not the actual content of such declaration), is not covered by the 
mischief of the exception, clause 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, which exempts 
personal information infringing privacy of an individual from being 
disclosed. Unsatisfied, the Supreme Court decided to appeal the judgment.  
III. THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION LAW 
The RTI Act lends content to and charts procedures for the effective 
realization of the fundamental right to information. In 1975, the Supreme 
Court conclusively held that the right to information is a fundamental 
right, and an inseparable part of the right to freedom of speech and 
expression.
41
 The RTI Act provides the legal right to information to all 
citizens of the country.
42
 Such right is available against the public 
authorities defined under the Act:   
“[P]ublic authority” means any authority or body or institution of 
self-government established or constituted— 
(a) by or under the Constitution; 
(b) by any other law made by Parliament; 
(c) by any other law made by State Legislature; 
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate 
Government, and includes any—  
 
 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975) 3 S.C.R. 333, 360. 
 42. RTI Act, supra note 4, § 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/7
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 (i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed; 
 (ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed, directly 
or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.
43
  
Apart from being established by the Constitution, the legislature, or 
government notification, any authority substantially financed by the 
government also qualifies as a public authority, which in simple terms 
means that wherever public money is involved, people have a right to 
know about the functioning and other details of such authority. The law 
has defined the term information in such a wide manner that “any material 
in any form” constitutes information.44 Thus, the citizens of India have a 
right to know anything about an authority that is substantially financed by 
them (apart from being established by or under the Constitution, law, or 
notification), if such information is not exempt from disclosure under the 
law,
45
 or the authority is not exempt from the applicability of the law.
46
 
Exemptions from disclosure under the RTI Act can be broadly defined 
under four general categories: (i) information pertaining to public order, 
security, and the integrity of the country; (ii) privileged and prohibited 
documents; (iii) information infringing on intellectual property rights; and 
(iv) personal information infringing on the privacy of an individual.  
The exemptions claimed by the Supreme Court with respect to asset 
disclosures fall broadly within the fourth category—personal information 
infringing on the privacy of an individual. The original controversy at 
issue was whether the fact that asset disclosures have been made is 
disclosable information. While analyzing this issue, I also consider 
whether the content of asset declarations should be exempted from 
disclosure.
47
 The Supreme Court claimed that an asset is personal 
information, the public disclosure of which constitutes invasion of privacy 
of the individual judges, and therefore should be exempt from disclosure 
under § 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
48
 The Supreme Court also contended that, 
because the CJI holds such information in a fiduciary capacity, it is 
exempt from disclosure under § 8(1)(e) of the law.
49
 While the High Court 
 
 
 43. Id. § 2(h). 
 44. Id. § 2(f). 
 45. Id. §§ 8–11. 
 46. Id. § 24, 2d sched. 
 47. In the particular case being analyzed, the High Court also addressed whether the contents 
could be disclosed under the RTI Act. 
 48. Sec’y Gen., Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, LPA No. 501/2009, ¶ 109, 
(2010) MANU 0013 (DE). 
 49. Id. ¶ 95. 
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denied the fiduciary contention,
50
 it did specify that asset declarations are 
personal information and could only be disclosed if public interest 
warrants such disclosure.
51
 
Even though the High Court has observed that there is no fiduciary 
relationship between the CJI and other judges of the Supreme Court, for 
the sake of discussion let us assume that the CJI and the other judges share 
a fiduciary relationship. Let us also take into account that asset 
declarations are personal information of the judges. The exception clauses 
with respect to information available through fiduciary relationships and 
personal information under the RTI Act read as follows: 
8(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in [the RTI] Act, there 
shall be no obligation to give any citizen, . . .  
(e) information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, 
unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public 
interest warrants the disclosure of such information; . . .  
(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure 
of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or 
which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the 
individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State 
Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case 
may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the 
disclosure of such information.
52
   
Thus, what is of utmost significance with respect to these two clauses is 
that neither is couched in absolute terms, the way some of the other 
exception provisions are worded.
53
 Both the above-mentioned exemptions 
for fiduciary and personal information are subject to the larger public 
interest. Even if information is held in a fiduciary relationship or if the 
information is purely personal, it has to be disclosed under the RTI Act if 
such information involves the larger public interest. Would assets declared 
by the judges then become disclosable to the people under the RTI Act, 
even if it is personal information held in a fiduciary relationship? Does it 
involve larger public interest? I argue in the next two parts of this Article 
 
 
 50.  Id. ¶ 102. 
 51.  Id. ¶ 116. 
 52.  RTI Act, supra note 4, §§ 8(1)(e), (j). 
 53. For example, § 8(1)(c) exempts from disclosure “information, the disclosure of which would 
cause a breach of privilege of Parliament or the State Legislature”; § 8(1)(h) exempts “information 
which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders.” RTI 
Act, supra note 4, §§ 8(1)(c), (h). 
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that asset declarations of the judges of higher judiciary involve the larger 
public interest. Therefore, irrespective of the personal nature of the 
information or the fiduciary relationship, such information must be 
disclosed.  
Before embarking on the substantive issue of the larger public interest, 
we also need to be aware at the outset that the Parliament had the option of 
excluding the higher judiciary or the Supreme Court, and the office of the 
CJI in particular, from the scope of the transparency law, as it did with 
seventeen organizations placed in Second Schedule under § 24.
54
 Since the 
Parliament chose not to do so, it must have thought the exemptions 
sufficiently safeguarded against any misuse of information available from 
the judiciary.  
The Parliament instead provided for a rights-based information regime, 
equally binding the higher judiciary as any other public authority. The 
statutory right to information regime is a far more efficacious instrument 
in the sense that it entrusts a corresponding duty on the public authorities 
to disclose information. In other words, for the enforcement of a 
fundamental right to information, a petitioner must resort to articles 32 and 
226 of the Constitution of India, which provide for remedies for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights.
55
 On the other hand, the right-based 
 
 
 54. Id. § 24, 2d sched. 
 55. Article 32 reads:  
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part: 
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of 
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs 
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, 
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. 
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), 
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its 
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). 
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided 
for by this Constitution. 
INDIA CONST. art. 32. Article 226 reads: 
Power of High Courts to issue certain writs: 
(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout the 
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, 
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within whose territories directions, orders or 
writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto 
and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III 
and for any other purpose. 
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, 
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in 
relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the 
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information regime mandates a duty on the public authorities to disclose 
information.
56
  
IV. DUTY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
The Supreme Court of India, as a public authority (established by the 
Constitution), is bound to disclose information in its possession. Does this 
also mean that the Court is bound to disclose personal information of the 
judges, obtained and held in a fiduciary relationship? One way to look at it 
is that the judiciary in the country is run by public money; judges are paid 
from the Consolidated Fund of India;
57
 judges of the higher judiciary 
enjoy enormous power that is largely unrestricted; and therefore, 
information about their assets involves the larger public interest. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the term “public interest” is 
self-explanatory.
58
 In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Others,
59
 Justice 
S. R. Pandian discussed the meaning of the term “public interest.” In doing 
so, he referred to its lexical definitions.
60
 He referenced the definition of 
the term in Black’s Law Dictionary:  
 
 
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the 
residence of such person is not within those territories. 
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or 
in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), 
without— 
 (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the 
plea for such interim order; and 
 (b) giving such party and opportunity of being heard, 
makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of 
such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such 
party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the 
date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so 
furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, 
before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the 
application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as 
the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. 
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the 
power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.   
INDIA CONST. art. 226. 
 56. Such information disclosure can be suo motu under section 4 of the law, or a request-based 
disclosure under section 6 of the law. RTI Act, supra note 4, §§ 4, 6 
 57. The Consolidated Fund of India is constitutive of all revenues received and all loans raised 
by the Government of India. INDIA CONST. art. 266.  
 58. Balco Employees Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 S.C.C. 333 (India) (stating therein that 
public interest litigation was merely what the words said: litigation in the interest of the public).  
 59. A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 892 (India). 
 60. See id. ¶ 53. 
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Something in which the public, the community at large, has some 
pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or 
liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere 
curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may 
be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens 
generally in affairs of local, state or national government . . . .
61
  
Justice Pandian also referenced the definition in Stroud’s Judicial 
Dictionary, which states that a matter of public interest “‘does not mean 
that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or 
amusement but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary 
interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are 
affected.’”62 The term seems to be defined and its meaning and import 
discussed contextually, rather than independently. In the present context, 
since the functioning of the higher judiciary does affect legal rights and 
liabilities of the people, and it involves pecuniary interest at a general 
level, it is in the public’s interest that information involving the judiciary 
be disclosed. 
The Supreme Court influences every aspect of the lives of the citizens 
(and non-citizens) in the country.
63
 The Court is asked to make 
determinations on a variety of issues, ranging from validation of the 
election of the Prime Minister
64
 to ordering the displacement of 
communities.
65
 Decisions such as these immediately affect the lives of the 
approximately one billion people of the country.
66
 Despite enjoying such 
enormous power and influence there is no built-in accountability 
mechanism for the Supreme Court.
67
 It is largely an elite enclosure 
 
 
 61. See id. ¶ 52.  
 62. See id. ¶ 51. 
 63. See Prashant Bhushan, Misplaced Priorities and Class Bias of the Judiciary, 44 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY., Apr. 4, 2009, at 32; see also S. P. Sathe, Appointment of Judges: The Issues, 33 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY. 2155 (1998); see also Prashant Bhushan, Securing Judicial Accountability: Towards an 
Independent Commission, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY., Oct. 27, 2007, at 14.   
 64. See Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Sri. Raj Narain and Another, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299.  
 65. Narmada Bachao Aandolan v. Union of India and Others, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3751.  
 66. See id. For example, the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River alone 
left an estimated 200,000 people displaced. Id.; see Narmada: The Facts, NEW INTERNATIONALIST 
MAG. (July 1, 2001), available at http://newint.org/features/2001/07/01/facts/; see also Nisha Kapadia, 
India’s Greatest Planned Environmental Disaster: The Narmada Valley Dam Project, U. MICH. 
ENVT’L JUST. CASE STUD., http://www.umich.edu/~snre492/Jones/narmada.html (last updated June 
17, 2004); see also Walter Fernandes, Sixty Years of Development-induced Displacement in India, in 
INDIA SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: DEVELOPMENT AND DISPLACEMENT 90–91 (Hari Mohan 
Mathur ed., 2008).  
 67. Prashant Bhushan, The Lack of Judicial Accountability in India, Address at Princeton 
University Department of South Asia Studies (Mar. 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://bharatiyas. 
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separated from the masses of the Indian Republic. Such separation gives 
the Supreme Court an inviolable status of unquestionable righteousness. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has also built its status with the help of 
contempt jurisdiction. But, increasingly, the high moral standards of the 
judiciary, including the Supreme Court, are being questioned by the 
people. Unaccounted assets are allegedly one such corrupting factor that is 
denigrating the moral status of the higher judiciary, which I discuss in the 
following paragraphs. 
In one instance, it is alleged that thirty-three judges of different 
standing (including one then-sitting judge of the Supreme Court, and eight 
High Court judges) embezzled Rs. 34.56 crore (345,600,000) a year in a 
scam that continued for almost eight years, where annual payment for each 
judge was in the nature of Rs. 96 lakh (9,600,000).
68
 This embezzlement 
happened at the cost of the Provident Fund of Class III and Class IV of the 
court employees.
69
 Beneficiaries of the embezzlement included the 
relatives of the judges.
70
 In another alleged instance, a judge of a High 
Court received Rs. 15 lakh (1,500,000) from a businessman through the 
Additional Advocate General.
71
 Beneficiaries again included the judge’s 
relatives.
72
 A former CJI allegedly issued judgments on more than one 
occasion that benefitted his son’s business.73 Primary documents allegedly 
exist that implicate the judge.
74
 He also allowed his son to conduct 
business from his official residence, which was his son’s declared business 
address.
75
 Incidentally, the 1999 Restatement of Values of Judicial Life by 
the higher judiciary prohibits use of a judge’s official residence for any 
 
 
in/cjarold/files/the_lack_of_judicial_accountability_in_india.pdf); see also Prashant Bhushan, Failing 
the Common People, D+C DEV. & COOPERATION (May 25, 2009), http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/ 
campaign-judicial-accountability-india. 
 68. Chandrani Banerjee, Bench Weaknesses, OUTLOOK MAG. (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.out 
lookindia.com/article.aspx?238908. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Chander Suta Dogra, A Sack Full of Cash, OUTLOOK MAG. (Aug. 29, 2008), http://www. 
outlookindia.com/article.aspx?238264. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Bhushan, Securing Judicial Accountability: Towards an Independent Commission, supra 
note 63, at 15; see also Prashant Bhushan, Contempt of Judicial Power, OUTLOOK MAG. (Sept. 19, 
2007), http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?235601; see also Arundhati Roy, Scandal in the 
Palace, OUTLOOK MAG. (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?235689; Rajinder 
Puri, Judges, Journos, Justice, OUTLOOK MAG. (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.outlookindia.com/ 
article.aspx?235797. 
 74. Vinod Mehta, Order! Order!, OUTLOOK MAG. (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.outlookindia.com/ 
article.aspx?235691. 
 75. Roy, supra note 73. 
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other professional work by the judge’s family members.76 This prohibition 
is only applicable for those members of the family who are also members 
of the Bar.
77
  
In another instance, two retired chief justices, of the Supreme Court 
and a High Court respectively, accepted Chairmanships of Committees for 
which a home minister nominated them; they had earlier heard and 
ultimately decided a dispute in favor of the home minister.
78
 Favored 
chairmanships, however, is a less alarming conduct on the misconduct 
scale. On the high end of the scale, a judge forged a signature for the 
mutation of his flat.
79
 Another judge of a High Court misappropriated 
funds that he received as a court-receiver and then gave a false explanation 
to the High Court about the transaction.
80
 Impeachment proceedings were 
initiated against him, and the Upper House of the Indian Parliament voted 
in favor of impeachment.
81
 He resigned, however, before the lower house 
of the Parliament could vote on the motion.
82
 Further, a judge in the lower 
judiciary was not hesitant to issue warrants even against the President of 
the country when he was paid Rs. 40,000.
83
 A High Court judge allegedly 
secured appointment because of proximity to politicians.
84
 There have also 
been allegations of disproportionate asset accumulation against the same 
judge.
85
  
Although there are other instances of alleged corruption among Indian 
judges, the point here is not to identify as many as possible. What I want 
to illustrate is that there are allegations of corruption, and sometimes these 
allegations are proved, which has forced some judges to resign. However, 
many of these allegations have not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
Even though corruption allegations against judges are not always proven, 
public confidence in the judiciary takes a beating because of these 
 
 
 76. Sec’y Gen., Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, LPA No. 501/2009, 
(2010) MANU 0013 (DE). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Puri, supra note 73. 
 79. Prashant Bhushan, Judging the Judges, OUTLOOK MAG. (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.outlook 
india.com/article.aspx?239534. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Timely Resignation Saves Justice Sen from Untimely Ouster, HINDU (Sept. 6, 2011, 2:26 
AM), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/timely-resignation-saves-justice-sen-from-untimely-
ouster/article2426007.ece. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Darshan Desai, Be in the Wig, OUTLOOK MAG. (Feb. 9, 2004), http://www.outlookindia.com/ 
article.aspx?222897. 
 84. Outlook Bureau, Judge Dread, OUTLOOK MAG. (May 12, 2003), http://www.outlookindia 
.com/article.aspx?220086. 
 85. Id. 
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allegations. These allegations are regularly pointed out and debated in the 
media, which excludes possibilities of judicial participation in clarifying 
or challenging the reports. These one sided allegations and reporting 
severely damage the independence of the judiciary and derogate the 
judiciary in people’s perceptions. By the disclosure of assets and other 
interests of the judges of the higher judiciary, the judiciary can counter 
these allegations and (sometimes) speculations to a certain extent, thereby 
gaining public trust and confidence in furtherance of their democratically 
grounded independence. Moreover, if widespread allegations are a reason 
for knowing the antecedents of the electoral candidates, as has been held 
by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ass’n for Democratic 
Reforms,
86
 by analogy, widespread allegations is a reason serious enough 
to know the antecedents of the judges of the higher judiciary.  
Disproportionate assets, more often than not, come in exchange for 
disproportionate favors. Is it not, therefore, a matter of larger public 
interest that asset declaration by the judges be made public? Is it not 
proper to identify the corrupt, rather than sharing the suspicion 
collectively? In all the above mentioned instances there have been 
pecuniary interests involved in one form or another, direct or indirect, 
personal or kin-oriented. Publication of asset declaration is, therefore, the 
key to unearth much of the misconduct of the judges. From another 
perspective, publication of asset declarations would act as a deterrent from 
misconduct. Though the necessity of deterrence casts implications 
unbecoming of a judge in the highest institution in the country, even so, if 
the not-so-distant past has taught us something about judges’ conduct, the 
people need to demand their right against the judiciary as a whole, and the 
higher judiciary in particular. The judiciary can deny the right only to its 
own peril. Such citizens’ right to information necessarily casts a duty of 
transparency on the greatest institution in India. If not for anything else, 
the judiciary should disclose information at least in the interest of its 
independence. In the next Part, I examine whether asset disclosure by 
judges adversely influences the independence of the higher judiciary, as 
the former CJI has claimed.
87
 I argue that transparency and disclosure of 
information about the judges is not only important for the citizens’ sake; 
they are also necessary for the sake of independence of the judiciary as a 
whole.  
 
 
 86. (2002) 3 S.C.R. 696 (India). 
 87. RTI Act Does Not Apply to My Office, supra note 1.  
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V. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 
The Indian Constitution is based on the idea of separation of power, 
where judicial function is separated from executive function in rendering 
public services.
88
 Independence of the judiciary is one of the constitutive 
pillars of the Constitution of India. It is part of the basic structure of the 
Constitution, which means that even through constitutional amendment, 
independence of the judiciary cannot be undermined.
89
 Independence of 
the judiciary is guarded and promoted by the Constitution through the 
selection, appointment, transfer, and termination of judges of the higher 
judiciary, non-interference of the legislature in judicial functions, and 
financial independence.  
The President of India appoints judges of the Supreme Court after 
consultation with the CJI (except when the Chief Justice is to be 
appointed), other judges of the Supreme Court, and the judges of the High 
Courts.
90
 It is the CJI, however, who makes ad hoc appointments to the 
Supreme Court with the consent of the President.
91
 Supreme Court judges 
hold their office until the age of sixty-five years or their resignation to the 
President.
92
 A Supreme Court judge may, however, be removed from 
office on the grounds of proven misbehavior or incapacity.
93
 Such removal 
can be executed only through proceedings wherein each house of the 
Parliament addresses the misbehavior or incapacity of the concerned 
judge, and votes to impeach the judge with two-thirds of the members of 
each house present and voting.
94
 Upon receipt of the report of this 
Parliamentary deliberation and impeachment by both the houses of the 
Parliament, the President can remove the judge from the Supreme Court.
95
 
Supreme Court judges are barred from pleading in any court or tribunal in 
India.
96
  
 
 
 88. INDIA CONST. art. 50.  
 89. See His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.R. 
225, wherein the Supreme Court developed the idea of basic structure of the Constitution. The Court 
decided that some characteristics of the Constitution of India are basic to the functioning of the 
Republic of India, and accordingly, these characteristics cannot be altered even by constitutional 
amendments. Id. 
 90. INDIA CONST. art. 124(2). 
 91. Id. arts. 127–28.  
 92. Id. art. 124(2).  
 93. Id. art. 124(4). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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While the salaries, allowances, and privileges of the judges are to be 
decided by law enacted by the Parliament, the conditions of service of the 
judges cannot be modified to the disadvantage of the judges.
97
 The 
expenses of the Supreme Court and salaries of the judges, officers, and 
servants of the Court are charged to the Consolidated Fund of India.
98
 The 
Supreme Court decides the rules and procedures for the conduct of the 
Court’s business.99 The CJI, or any other judge she designates, appoints 
the officers and servants of the Court and determines their service 
conditions.
100
  
The President of India also appoints the judges of the High Courts in 
the different states after consulting with the CJI, the governor of the state, 
and the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court (except when a Chief 
Justice of the High Court is to be appointed).
101
 High Court judges hold 
office until they are sixty-two years old, until they resign, are removed, or 
had been appointed in an ad hoc manner.
102
 The Chief Justice of the High 
Courts, with the consent of the President, makes ad hoc appointments of 
retired High Court judges.
103
 The Chief Justice of a High Court is also 
entitled to appoint officers and servants of the Court.
104
 The impeachment 
procedure is the same for the removal of the judges of the High Court on 
grounds of misbehavior or incapacity as is followed for the judges of the 
Supreme Court.
105
 The President of India, upon consultation with the 
CJI,
106
 can transfer a High Court judge to any other High Court or appoint 
her to the Supreme Court.
107
 Once a judge has held a permanent office in a 
High Court, she cannot plead in any court in India except for the High 
Courts and the Supreme Court.
108
 Like the Supreme Court judges, salaries 
and conditions of service of the judges of the High Courts cannot be 
modified to their disadvantage,
109
 and their pensions are to be charged to 
the Consolidated Fund of India.
110
   
 
 
 97. Id. art. 125. 
 98. Id. art. 146; see also id. art. 112. The Consolidated Fund of India is free from any legislative 
and executive interference.  
 99. Id. art. 145.  
 100. Id. art. 146. 
 101. Id. art. 217. 
 102. Id. arts. 217, 224. 
 103. Id. art. 224A. 
 104. Id. art. 229. 
 105. Id. arts. 217–18, 124. 
 106. Id. arts. 124, 222. 
 107. Id. art. 217, 124. 
 108. Id. art. 220. 
 109. Id. arts. 221–22. 
 110. Id. art. 112. 
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Thus the Constitution of India secures judicial independence by 
insulating judicial appointment, transfer, termination, and funding from 
executive interference. However, in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, the 
Court held that the opinion of the CJI need not have primacy in matters of 
appointment of judges to the higher judiciary, despite the fact that judicial 
independence is a basic feature of the Constitution.
111
 The Court noted that 
the “ultimate power of appointment rests with the Central Government.”112 
This power rests with the executive because the executive is accountable 
to the legislature, and, through the legislature, to the people of India. The 
people of India, therefore, are the ultimate arbiter of judicial independence 
and executive accountability.
113
  
However, in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. 
Union of India,
114
 the Supreme Court overruled S.P. Gupta so far as the 
priority of the executive in judicial appointments is concerned.
115
 The 
Court noted that in cases of conflicting opinions during the appointment 
process of judges, the opinion of the CJI is to be given primacy because 
the Chief Justice is better placed to ascertain and suggest the 
appropriateness of the possible candidates for appointment.
116
 However, 
the Court added a nuance to the idea of primacy of the Chief Justice’s 
opinion. According to the Court, it is not the personal opinion of the Chief 
Justice that should enjoy primacy. Rather, what matters is the collective 
 
 
 111. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, ¶¶ 26, 29 (P. N. Bhagwati, J.). 
 112. Id. ¶ 29.  
 113. Id.  
 114. A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 268. 
 115. Id. ¶ 41. 
 116. Id. Justifying its decision of prioritizing the opinion of the Chief Justice of India over the 
executive branch of the state, the Court noted: 
There is no occasion to discuss the merits of any individual appointment in the legislature on 
account of the restriction imposed by . . . the Constitution. Experience has shown that 
[appointment of judges] also does not form a part of the manifesto of any political party, and 
is not a matter which is, or can be, debated during the election campaign. There is thus no 
manner in which the assumed accountability of the executive in the matter of appointment of 
an individual judge can be raised, or has been raised at any time. On the other hand, in actual 
practice, the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court, being responsible 
for the functioning of the courts, have to face the consequence of any unsuitable appointment 
which gives rise to criticism levelled [sic] by the ever vigilant Bar. That controversy is raised 
primarily in the courts. Similarly, the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, 
whose participation is involved with the Chief Justice in the functioning of the courts, and 
whose opinion is taken into account in the selection process, bear the consequences and 
become accountable. Thus, in actual practice, the real accountability in the matter of 
appointments of superior Judges is that of the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justices of 
the High Courts, and not of the executive . . . .  
Id. ¶ 44. 
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opinion of the highest judiciary expressed through the Chief Justice,
117
 
because for appointment matters, the Chief Justice needs to form her 
opinion after consulting her senior colleagues.
118
 The Chief Justice is also 
responsible for the transfer of judges of the higher judiciary.
119
   
In In Re. Appointment and Transfer of Judges,
120
 the Supreme Court, 
on a Presidential reference (made under article 143 of the Constitution) 
confirmed the law
121
 on primacy of the opinion of the CJI on matters of 
appointment and transfer of judges as laid down in the Supreme Court 
Advocates-on-Record Association case. The Court also specified the 
number of judges to be consulted and the justification for consulting the 
respective judges.
122
 The Court pointed out that the bases for the formation 
of the collegium of judges for consultation purposes are seniority of the 
judges, knowledge of the candidates, and familiarity with the court where 
the possible candidates are based.
123
  
Thus, in furtherance of judicial independence, the judiciary has 
gradually insulated itself from executive interference and popular 
democratic outlets.
124
 The Supreme Court changed the law prioritizing the 
executive in the appointment of judges as laid down in S.P. Gupta in 
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association, which prioritized the 
CJI. However, in order to ensure internal accountability and 
appropriateness of the selection process, the Court in In Re. Appointment 
and Transfer of Judges clarified that the opinion of the CJI must be based 
on a consultation process involving senior puisne judges of the Supreme 
Court.
125
 In S.P. Gupta, the Supreme Court, quoting B. R. Ambedkar, 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution of India, showed 
that the Constituent Assembly, while promoting independence of the 
judiciary, did not envisage primacy of the Chief Justice in appointment 
 
 
 117. Id. ¶ 46. 
 118. Id. ¶¶ 46, 56, 68. 
 119. Id. ¶ 61. 
 120. (1998) 7 S.C.C. 739. 
 121. As per Article 141 of the Constitution of India, law declared by the Supreme Court is binding 
throughout the territory of India. INDIA CONST. art. 141. 
 122. Shanti Bhushan and Another v. Union of India and Another, (1998) 7 S.C.C. 739, at ¶¶ 10, 
19. 
 123. Id.  
 124. See Robert Moog, Judicial Activism in the Cause of Judicial Independence—The Indian 
Supreme Court in the 1990s, 85 JUDICATURE 268 (2002); see also Neeraj Tiwari, Appointment of 
Judges in Higher Judiciary: An Interpretational Riddle (LL.M. Student Working Paper, Indian Law 
Institute, New Delhi, Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1485395. 
 125. (1998) 7 S.C.C. 739, at ¶¶ 10, 18. 
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matters.
126
 Interestingly however, quoting the same passage from 
Ambedkar’s speech, the Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record 
Association noted that the Constituent Assembly was against primacy of 
the CJI in her individual capacity, and therefore, the Chief Justice needed 
to form her opinion after consultation with other puisne judges, and then 
the CJI’s opinion would attain primacy.127  
The Supreme Court thus transferred the executive power of 
appointment of judges to the judiciary. The Constitution of India 
categorically states that the judges of the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts are to be appointed and transferred (for High Court judges) by the 
President after consultation with judges as the President may deem 
necessary.
128
 The Constitution, however, empowers the CJI and the Chief 
Justices of the High Courts to appoint ad hoc judges to the Supreme Court 
and the High Courts with the prior consent of the President.
129
 Given the 
unambiguous meaning of these constitutional provisions, it seems logical 
to conclude that the President of India has the power to appoint and 
transfer judges of the higher judiciary, and that the consultation process is 
the prerogative of the President.  
From the unambiguous and categorical constitutional provisions it 
seems likely, as the Supreme Court in S. P. Gupta delineated, that the 
power of appointment and transfer of judges of the higher judiciary rests 
primarily with the executive. However, in negating the primacy of the 
executive and establishing the primacy of the judiciary, the Supreme Court 
in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and In Re. 
Appointment and Transfer of Judges offered a two-pronged justification. 
First, the Court noted that since the Chief Justice and other senior judges 
are better placed to know the antecedents of the possible candidates for 
appointments, their opinion should have priority over the executive.
130
 
Second, the Court asserted that the idea of democratic accountability of the 
executive for judicial appointments is misplaced because political parties 
and election manifestoes do not make judicial appointments electoral 
issues.
131
 On the contrary, according to the Court, judges are accountable 
 
 
 126. (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, ¶ 29. 
 127. See generally Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Ass’n v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 
S.C. 268. 
 128. INDIA CONST. arts. 124, 126, 217, 222–24.  
 129. Id. arts. 127–28, 224A. 
 130. In spite of knowledge about a candidate, the collegiums of judges sometimes make mistakes 
in recommending a candidate for appointment. See Prashant Bhushan, The Dinakaran Imbroglio: 
Appointments and Complaints against Judges, 44 ECON. & POL. WKLY., Oct. 10, 2009, at 10.  
 131. See Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Ass’n, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 268, ¶ 44.  
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to the Bar for judicial appointments, and, therefore, judges should be the 
ones with the final word on appointments and transfers.
132
 This latter 
observation of the Court is contrary to its stand in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. 
Justice A. M. Bhattacharjee, where the Supreme Court categorically noted 
that “[j]udges are not to be judged by the Bar.”133  
Yet, in the abovementioned cases, the Supreme Court did not address 
whether it is possible to take any action against the judges for bad 
appointments, an avenue that is open against the executive through the 
electoral process and legislative scrutiny. Even though legislative scrutiny 
into judicial functions and conduct of judges in the discharge of their 
duties is prohibited (except for impeachment purposes),
134
 there is no bar 
on legislative scrutiny of executive action regarding appointment and 
transfer of judges. Thus, while executive action can be scrutinized, judicial 
action cannot be scrutinized in the same manner.  
It is useful here to note that the RTI Act prohibits disclosure of 
information that cannot be discussed in the Parliament and state legislative 
assemblies.
135
 Accordingly, it is possible to argue that since the Parliament 
and the state legislative assemblies cannot discuss the conduct of judges in 
the discharge of their duties, the RTI Act prohibits disclosure of such 
information. A careful examination of the constitutional provision, 
however, would suggest that such a sweeping prohibition on disclosure is 
highly unlikely, because the Constitution only prohibits discussion of 
judges’ conduct so far as it relates to the discharge of their duties. 
Specifically, the legislature cannot debate notes, orders, and judgments 
delivered by the judiciary, or the administrative functioning of the 
judiciary. However, this constitutional prohibition does not bar legislative 
scrutiny of misconduct of judges, or of aspects that might undermine the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Hence, the declaration of 
assets and other interests could be made public as per the RTI Act because 
these interests can undermine the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary.  
As discussed above, the Constitution provides for adequate safeguards 
in furtherance of the independence of the judiciary in a democratic 
republic. It separates the judiciary from the executive and prohibits the 
Parliament and the state legislatures from questioning the conduct of 
judges of the higher judiciary in furtherance of their judicial duties. It 
 
 
 132. Id.  
 133. (1995) 5 S.C.C. 457, ¶ 3. 
 134. INDIA CONST. arts. 121, 211.  
 135. RTI Act, supra note 4, Proviso to § 8(1)(j). 
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disqualifies members of Parliament and members of legislative assemblies 
from holding any office of profit, including the offices of judges of the 
higher judiciary.
136
 It also provides for an arduous and elaborate process 
for the impeachment of judges. However, through judicial activism, the 
Supreme Court of India has completely insulated the judiciary from any 
democratic deliberation, thereby sacrificing accountability and 
transparency in the functioning of the judges. There is an argument that 
the judiciary has made itself an elite club, armed with contempt 
jurisdiction that undermines the democratic framework of the Constitution.  
Accountability and transparency are not only necessary for upholding 
the democratic underpinnings of the Constitution, but are also necessary 
for the independence of the judiciary itself, because if public trust and 
confidence in the judiciary cannot be maintained, the judiciary is destined 
to lose its independence. In spite of the differences of opinion in the 
Supreme Court cases discussed above, the Court agreed on one aspect: 
that honesty, integrity, impartiality, moral vigor, ethical firmness, non-
corruptibility, humility, good behavior, emotional stability, objective and 
fearless approach, social acceptability, and endurance are essential 
personal characteristics of the judges if the judiciary aspires to remain 
independent.
137
  
As discussed earlier, however, the conduct of the judges of the higher 
judiciary is not always beyond doubt, which contributes to the erosion of 
public confidence in the judiciary. The problem is complicated by the fact 
that there is no easy way to address the problem of judges of dubious and 
questionable character. Judges can be removed only through the process of 
impeachment on the grounds of proven misbehavior or incapacity. 
However, as the history of the impeachment proceedings in India shows, 
such proceedings are highly unlikely to remove judges from their office. 
Instead, judges will resign from their office when they are reasonably 
certain of the outcome of the impeachment proceeding.
138
  
Moreover, because of the complicated and cumbersome nature of the 
proceedings, impeachment proceedings are only reserved for the rarest of 
rare cases of misconduct,
139
 as it is difficult to implicate judges for 
 
 
 136. See INDIA CONST. arts. 102, 191; see also M. P. Singh, Securing the Independence of the 
Judiciary—The Indian Experience, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 245, 251 (2000).  
 137. See generally Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Ass’n v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 
S.C. 268; see generally S.P. Gupta v. President of India and others, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365.   
 138. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Prashant Bhushan, Judicial Accountability or Illusion?, 41 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4847 
(2006); see also Bhushan, Securing Judicial Accountability: Towards an Independent Commission, 
supra note 63, at 14–15. 
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relatively minor misconduct. In C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A. M. 
Bhattacharjee,
140
 the Supreme Court made it clear that there is no other 
recourse against minor aberrations of judges except for “self-regulation 
through inhouse procedure.”141 The Court categorically pointed out that 
misconduct of judges of the higher judiciary can only be dealt with 
through the impeachment proceedings.
142
 But, as the counsels in C. 
Ravichandran Iyer point out, in view of the recent allegations of 
corruption and misconduct, it is necessary to develop a mechanism 
through which minor aberrations of the judges could be dealt with.
143
  
For the sake of independence of the judiciary and retaining public faith 
in the high judicial office, the insulated judicial framework needs to 
integrate democratic outlets. One democratic outlet could be attained 
through lifting of the veil of secrecy from judicial appointments, transfers, 
disclosure of assets and asset sources for the judges and their close 
relatives, disclosure of their affiliations and interests, and disclosure of any 
other information that might conflict with their official duties. In S.P. 
Gupta, the Supreme Court noted:  
No Chief Justice or Judge should be allowed to hide his improper or 
irresponsible action under the cloak of secrecy. If any Chief Justice 
or Judge has behaved improperly or irresponsibly or in a manner not 
befitting the high office he holds, there is no reason why his action 
should not be exposed to public gaze. We believe in an open 
Government and openness in Government does not mean openness 
merely in the functioning of the executive arm of the State. The 
same openness must characterise the functioning of the judicial 
apparatus . . . .
144
 
It is interesting to note that even though the Supreme Court overruled 
S. P. Gupta so far as the primacy of the executive in the appointment of 
judges is concerned, the Court has not altered the disclosure requirement 
for misconduct of judges.
145
 Accordingly, it could be argued that the 
consecutive benches of the Supreme Court agree with this observation 
made in S. P. Gupta. From this observation, it logically follows that the 
important aspects in establishing the character, personality, behavior, 
 
 
 140. (1995) 5 S.C.C. 457. 
 141. Id. ¶¶ 15, 20, 34, 40–42. 
 142. Id. ¶ 20. 
 143. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. 
 144. (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, ¶ 84. 
 145. See generally Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Ass’n v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 
S.C. 268.  
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soundness, endurance, and social acceptability of the judges need to be 
brought to light in order to strengthen people’s faith in the judiciary and its 
independence. Thus releasing information about assets, affiliations, and 
interests of judges should not be seen as impairing independence of the 
judiciary. Rather, it should be seen as a step toward the promotion of a 
more democratically grounded independent judiciary. 
VI. WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
Despite the constitutional civil and political rights based on the United 
States’ Constitution, the framing fathers of the Indian Constitution thought 
it prudent not to follow the U.S. model for the appointment of judges of 
the higher judiciary.
146
 Article II, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides, 
“[t]he President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court.”147 
The appointment of the judges involves the people’s participation, albeit in 
an indirect manner. Any nomination made by the President has to be 
confirmed by the Senate.
148
 The President’s nomination is however, not a 
de facto selection. Among the 130 nominations made by the President in 
U.S. history, thirty have failed in the Senate.
149
 The nomination process is 
televised, not secretive, and often involves significant emphasis on 
political considerations apart from judicial merit.
150
 
 
 
 146. See Testimony of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on May 24, 1949, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 
VOL. VIII, available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol8p7b.htm.   
 147.  Article II, Section 2 reads: 
The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of 
the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he 
may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive 
departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall 
have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in 
cases of impeachment. 
 He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose 
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: 
but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.  
The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of 
the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.  
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2. 
 148.  Id.  
 149. Norman Dorsen, The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 652 
(2006). 
 150. Id.; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. 
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Conversely, the Indian President appoints Supreme Court judges after 
consulting with the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
151
 In 
India however, after the decision of the Supreme Court in In re 
Appointment and Transfer of Judges,
152
 nominations made by the judges 
constitute the de facto selection on behalf of the President. Unlike the U.S. 
proceedings, nomination proceedings happen behind closed doors without 
any public knowledge.
153
 Once an appointment is made, it is extremely 
difficult to remove a judge through the cumbersome impeachment 
proceedings. In fact, there has not been any instance of impeachment of a 
judge in India so far. The purported reason for the non-political 
appointment procedure is to do away with any (partisan) political 
considerations in the appointment process, and give primacy only to the 
merit, thereby preserving the independence of the judiciary and insulating 
it from executive interference.
154
 But the appointment of judges by judges 
has shown that the elite enclosure is incapable of considering merit outside 
its brethren. Despite non-lawyer (and non-judge) Indian jurists being 
respected, consulted, and appointed internationally, the judges of the 
Supreme Court have failed to appoint a single non-lawyer (and non-judge) 
judge in the Supreme Court even though the Constitution provides for the 
same.
155
 On the other hand, there are numerous instances where law 
professors and non-lawyers have been appointed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court on merit.
156
 Judges also seem to ignore their sisters in appointment 
matters, as there is a significant lack of female judges on the higher 
judiciary in India.
157
  
Judges selected to the higher judiciary in such a non-transparent and 
undemocratic process often overrule democratic policy and shape the lives 
of more than one billion people, who have no voice in the judges’ 
 
 
REV. 315 (1999) (analyzing the importance of and balance between judicial independence and judicial 
accountability in the context of the United States). 
 151. INDIA CONST. art. 124. 
 152. (1998) 7 S.C.C. 739. 
 153. See Sathe, supra note 63, at 2155; see also Sec’y Gen., Supreme Court of India, LPA No. 
501/2009. 
 154. Supra note 137.  
 155. INDIA CONST. art. 124(3)(c). Some jurists also point out the oligarchic class-structure of the 
higher judiciary in India. See Bhushan, Misplaced Priorities and Class Bias of the Judiciary, supra 
note 63, at 37.  
 156. Dorsen, supra note 149. 
 157. Kounteya Sinha, Less-than-Equal Status for Indian Women: Report, TIMES OF INDIA (Dec. 4, 
2012), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-04/india/35593606_1_women-judges-indian-
women-urban-women; see also Just 45 Women as HC Judges, Not One in SC, TIMES OF INDIA (Aug. 3, 
2009), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Just-45-women-as-HC-judges-not-one-in-SC/article 
show/4849980.cms?referral=PM.  
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appointments. If the Supreme Court’s judgments are to be believed, even 
the Court itself should not like such secretive, non-democratic elitism. In 
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain,
158
 the people’s right to receive 
information was conclusively recognized. The Court notes:  
In a government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of 
the public must be responsible for their conduct, there can be but 
few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every 
public act, everything, that is done in a public way, by their public 
functionaries.
159
  
Further, in People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India,160 
the Supreme Court reiterates that “[p]eople of this country have a right to 
know every public act, everything that is done in a public way, by the 
public functionaries.”161  
Delineating the scope of the fundamental right of freedom of speech 
and expression, the Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) 
Private Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others
162 
observes:  
Freedom of expression . . . assists in the discovery of truth . . . [and] 
strengthens the capacity of an individual in participating in decision 
making . . . . In sum, the fundamental principle involved here is the 
people’s right to know. Freedom of speech and expression should 
therefore, receive a generous support from all those who believe in 
the participation of people in the administration.
163
 
In another decision, justifying the declaration of assets by the electoral 
candidates, the Court reasoned:  
[T]here are widespread allegations of corruption against the persons 
holding post and power. In such a situation, [the] question is not of 
knowing personal affairs but to have openness in democracy for 
attempting to cure cancerous growth of corruption by few rays of 
light. Hence, citizens who elect MPs or MLAs are entitled to know 
that their representative has not misconducted himself in collecting 
wealth after being elected. This information could be easily 
 
 
 158. (1975) 3 S.C.R. 333.  
 159. Id. ¶ 74. 
 160. (2003) 1 S.C.C. 2353.  
 161. Id. ¶ 35. 
 162. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 515. 
 163. Id. ¶ 12. 
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gathered only if prior to election, the assets of such person are 
disclosed.
164
 
The Court further observed:  
[W]here there is inaction by the executive, for whatever reason, the 
judiciary must step in, in exercise of its constitutional obligations to 
provide a solution till such time the legislature acts to perform its 
role by enacting proper legislation to cover the field. The adverse 
impact of lack of probity in public life leading to a high degree of 
corruption is manifold. Therefore, if the candidate is directed to 
declare his/her spouse’s and dependants’ assets immovable, 
moveable and valuable articles it would have its own effect.
165
  
Thus the Court, while justifying its executive role, emphasizes the 
significance of asset declarations in limiting corruption in public life by 
public servants. 
The Court held that a public servant is a “‘person who holds an office 
by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public 
duty.’”166 The Court asserts: 
Not only, therefore, must the person hold an office but he must be 
authorised or required by virtue of that office to perform a public 
duty. Public duty is defined by Section 2(b) of [The Prevention of 
Corruption] Act, 1988 to mean “a duty in the discharge of which the 
State, the public or that community at large has an interest.”167  
From this delineation of the Supreme Court, it is undoubtedly clear that 
the judges of the higher judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, are public 
servants. The Constitution of India explicitly specifies that judges perform 
public service.
168
 Since judges are also public servants, why should the 
duty to disclose assets and antecedents not apply to them as well? There 
cannot be two rules of democracy—one to preach, and one to practice. A 
two-rule democratic framework is bound to draw allegations of hypocrisy, 
which is not healthy for the functioning of one of the most significant 
democratic institutions of a democratic republic. There are signs that the 
judiciary does not practice what it preaches. The inviolable fundamental 
 
 
 164. Union of India v. Ass’n for Democratic Reforms & Another & People’s Union for Civil 
Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (2002) 5 S.C.C. 294, ¶ 47.  
 165. Id. ¶ 52.  
 166. P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 S.C.C. 626, ¶ 162. 
 167. Id.  
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right to speech and expression is met with contempt of court jurisdiction, 
if such expression happens to criticize the judiciary or highlight alleged 
misconduct of a retired CJI.
169
  
The suo motu contempt cognizance by the Delhi High Court against 
journalists reporting misconduct of a retired judge
170
 shows how the higher 
judiciary is increasingly insulating itself from any kind of criticism. The 
higher judiciary is becoming overly sensitive in contempt proceedings. 
Contempt proceedings against the Mid-Day Newspaper
171
 and Arundhati 
Roy
172
 have only undermined the judiciary’s respectability. A survey of the 
judiciary’s use of contempt jurisdiction suggests that any issue that 
offends the judiciary or the judges can constitute contempt of court as 
determined by the judiciary.
173
 There is no clear and categorical domain of 
contempt of court jurisprudence. Voices not suiting the inviolable status of 
the institution are muted. The Court’s preaching of freedom of expression 
and right to information becomes irrelevant in contempt of court 
proceedings. 
With respect to the right to information, the Supreme Court will 
possibly decide its own case—a dispute where a former CJI has already 
expressed his apparent bias (he was the CJI when the Delhi High Court 
decided the disclosure dispute).
174
 The then-Attorney General G.E. 
Vahanvati proposed that the Supreme Court finally decide the RTI Act 
issue.
175
 The full Supreme Court decided to take up the appeal.
176
 The 
Court has therefore appealed to itself to reconsider the Delhi High Court 
judgment,
177
 which is a clear and substantial violation of the cardinal 
principle of judicial propriety—nemo judex in re sua, i.e., no man should 
judge his own cause. A judge is disqualified from deciding any issue in 
 
 
 169. Mriganka Shekhar Dutta & Amba Uttara Kak, Contempt of Court: Finding the Limit, 2 
NAT’L U. JURID. SCI. L. REV. 55 (2009). 
 170. Court on its own Motion v. M.K. Tayal and Others, 2007 (98) D.R.J. 41. 
 171. Id. 
 172. In re Arundhati Roy, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 1375. 
 173. Dutta, supra note 169. 
 174. The 1999 Restatement of Values of Judicial Life further mandates the judges not to express 
opinions in public: “A Judge shall not enter into public debate or express his views in public on 
political matters or on matters that are pending or are likely to arise for judicial determination.” 
Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, Bill No. 136 of 2010, available at http://www.prsindia. 
org/uploads/media/Judicial%20Standard/Judicial%20standard%20and%20accountibility%20bill,%202
010.pdf. But the CJI has already made his reservations on RTI applicability to his office. See RTI Act 
Does Not Apply to my Office, supra note 1.  
 175. J. Venkatesan, Vahanvati: It’s for Supreme Court to Decide on RTI Applicability to CJI, 
HINDU (Jan. 16, 2010), http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/16/stories/2010011660981300.htm. 
 176. J. Venkatesan, Supreme Court Appeals to Supreme Court over RTI, HINDU (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://www.hindu.com/2010/03/09/stories/2010030959500100.htm. 
 177. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
350 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:321 
 
 
 
 
which there might be a possibility of bias.
178
 The threshold is exceedingly 
high, so much so that only a mere possibility of bias can vitiate a 
judgment; it is not necessary to prove actual exercise of bias.
179
 However, 
in cases of necessity, the threshold could be diluted.
180
 One such necessity 
could be staring at the Supreme Court when the Court sits to decide its 
own appeal on the RTI Act. But, goodwill and prudence could have 
triumphed over the necessity had the full Supreme Court decided not to 
appeal the Delhi High Court decision. 
Even after the Supreme Court judges, and some High Court judges, 
voluntarily disclosed their assets after the single-bench decision of the 
Delhi High Court,
181
 the Supreme Court appealed the single-bench 
decision. The Supreme Court further prefers to appeal the three-bench 
judgment of the Delhi High Court. Now, since the Court has decided to 
appeal the three-bench High Court decision, it takes upon itself a 
tremendous responsibility of upholding the democratic principles of the 
Indian Republic. The Court would decide the matter at a time when the 
future of asset disclosures seemed certain. The Upper House of the 
Parliament had once rejected passing the Judges (Declaration of Assets 
and Liabilities) Bill 2009 because it did not mandate asset disclosures by 
the judges.
182
 After asset disclosure was mandated under the Bill, the 
Lower House of the Parliament passed the Judicial Standards and 
Accountability Bill 2010.
183
 This law mandates judicial accountability 
through disclosure of assets, empowers an individual to institute a 
complaint against the judiciary, and promotes close scrutiny of the conduct 
of the judges.
184
 The Supreme Court would have an opportunity to review 
the constitutionality of the 2010 law when it decides the appeal against the 
Delhi High Court judgment. One hopes that the Supreme Court takes note 
of these developments while deciding its own cause. The history of the 
 
 
 178. WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 471 (7th ed. 1994); but 
see Bhushan, Securing Judicial Accountability: Towards an Independent Commission, supra note 63, 
at 15–16 (where a judge decides a case of contempt of court, in which a criticism against his own 
previous action was held to be a contempt of the court).   
 179. WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 178, at 471–93. 
 180. Id. at 476–79. 
 181. See Prashant Bhushan, Judicial Accountability: Assets Disclosures and Beyond, 44 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY., Sept. 12, 2009, at 8. 
 182. See Sujay Mehdudia, Opposition Forces Deferment of Judges’ Assets Bill, HINDU (Aug. 4, 
2009), http://blogs.thehindu.com/delhi/?p=27258; see also Bhushan, supra note 181, at 9.  
 183. Lok Sabha Passes Judicial Accountability Bill, HINDU (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.thehindu. 
com/news/national/lok-sabha-passes-judicial-accountability-bill/article3263673.ece; see also The 
Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, No. 136 of 2010, supra note 174. 
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174. 
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Court shows that it is capable enough in protecting the basic structure of 
the nation. The proverbial “little man with a little pencil” hopes that the 
Supreme Court is infallible this time.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
According to the RTI Act, no public authority is under any obligation 
to generate information for the purpose of the law. It is only when 
information is already available with a public authority that the authority is 
under an obligation to disclose such information, if such information is not 
exempted under law. As I have argued in this Article, however, the higher 
judiciary in India should proactively generate and disclose information 
about assets and interests of the judges under the RTI Act in order to 
promote democratically grounded independence of the judiciary.  
The Supreme Court argued in the Delhi High Court that if the Supreme 
Court is required to disclose information under the RTI Act, then the Court 
would have to disclose draft judgments, notes, and other communications 
between judges in furtherance of their duties, which will adversely affect 
the independence of the judiciary. Yet such apprehension is unfounded 
because the Constitution prohibits the legislature from discussing matters 
pertaining to the duties performed by the judiciary, and accordingly, the 
RTI Act prohibits such disclosure. Moreover, if a court or tribunal forbids 
a disclosure, such disclosure cannot be made under the RTI Act.
185
 The 
Supreme Court also contended that the RTI Act only mandates disclosure 
of information that is in public domain, but, as the Delhi High Court 
pointed out, the RTI Act, which mandates disclosure whenever 
information is available to public authorities if it is not barred under the 
Act, does not support such a contention. Thus it is difficult to conceive 
that disclosure of information under the RTI Act would adversely affect 
the independence of the judiciary. 
The aftermath of this dispute is an opportune moment for the Supreme 
Court to uphold the dignity of the higher judiciary before people’s 
confidence withers away, as has happened with politicians. Right to 
information is a fundamental right, which the RTI Act realizes. At the 
High Court stage, the Supreme Court came up with many technical 
arguments to undermine its duty to disclose. In the process, the Supreme 
Court also undermined the 1997 Resolution, on which the judges of the 
Supreme Court and High Courts have relied in a bona fide manner. Some 
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High Courts also resolved to make asset declarations public under the 
Resolution. The Supreme Court also argued that the Resolution declares 
the information confidential. The RTI Act specifies that any law, rule, or 
regulation that is in conflict with the RTI Act shall be subservient to the 
RTI Act, meaning that the transparency law overrides any confidentiality 
clause in the 1997 Resolution. The essence of the transparency law lies in 
the fact that any information that is of public interest shall override the 
exceptions mentioned in the law or restrictions put in place by other 
legislation. As the Supreme Court observed in 1975,
186
 the public interest 
in disclosure has to be weighed against the public interest in non-
disclosure; only after balancing these two conflicting interests can a 
decision be rendered regarding disclosure. As I have argued in this Article, 
the public interest in disclosure far outweighs the public interest in non-
disclosure of assets and interests of the judges.  
Therefore, instead of looking for loopholes in the law and ascertaining 
an escape clause to avoid disclosure, the Supreme Court should interpret 
the law in its true spirit, and embrace disclosure of information as a matter 
of law. The Court should take this opportunity to reestablish itself as the 
doyen of Indian democracy, especially when the entire Court is going to 
decide the future of the right of information. It is time to abandon the 
imperial baggage of judicial elitism and conspicuous secrecy. The 
Supreme Court should begin practicing what it preaches. While allowing 
the judiciary to be controlled and regulated by the executive or the 
legislature might be fraught with danger,
187
 it is also dangerous to allow 
the judiciary to function without any semblance of accountability and 
public scrutiny. 
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